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LOVE AT WORK
SHARON RABIN-MARGALIOTH*

I. INTRODUCTION
Work is serious business. Management requires that employees act
rationally while on the job. Workers are expected to compartmentalize their onduty and off-duty lives. At work, they should devote themselves to the tasks of
the job and avoid thinking as much as possible about personal issues. This
approach is one of the pillars of the 1911 employment volume The Principles of
1
Scientific Management, which directed much of how twentieth-century American
2
employers handled their workforce.
Compartmentalization is becoming increasingly more onerous. Today
many people form personal relationships at work with co-workers, supervisors,
3
subordinates or clients. As many Americans are getting married at an older age
4
5
and are working longer hours in less sex-segregated work environments, it is
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1. FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1947)
(advocating for an application of “scientific” methods to the problem of controlling labor). See John
Fabian Witt, Speedy Fred Taylor and the Ironies of Enterprise Liability, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12-14 (2003).
In his article, Witt describes how Taylor’s managing theory encourages management to put into
place precisely calibrated methods for even the most routine tasks in the production process. Id.
Scientific reorganization of the processes of work allows management to substitute science for the
individual judgment of the workman. Id. In advocating the importance of managerial control,
Taylor also announces a new principle of managerial responsibility: Firms can be, and indeed, ought
to be, responsible for managing wide swaths of American social life. Id.
2. Marion Crain, The Transformation of the Professional Workforce, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 543, 55557 (2004) (“An important strategic tool in employers’ control over manual labor was scientific
management, which achieved popularity during the first half of the twentieth century. Scientific
management refers to the systematic process of dividing jobs into discrete components so as to
centralize control over the knowledge of the labor process in management and increase profits. Its
aim is to wrest from skilled workers control over the knowledge that constitutes the craft. Through
the use of time and motion studies designed to maximize output, skilled workers become
automatons tending machines . . . . Scientific management, as its name implies, purports to subject
workers and employers to the objective laws of science rather than to the arbitrary whims of human
beings.”).
3. For updated data on first marriage age, see Robert Schoen & Vladimir Canudas-Romo,
Timing Effects on First Marriage: Twentieth-Century Experience in England and Wales and the USA, 59
POPULATION STUD. 135 (2005), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=
Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16096194&dopt=Citation.
4. See JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE IN LEISURE
(1991) (finding that since the 1960s, annual hours have been increasing).
5. Barbara Reskin, Sex Segregation in the Workplace, 19 ANN. REV. SOC. 241, 243 (1993) (finding
that occupational segregation has declined since 1970 even though most workers remain in sex
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inevitable that some workplace interaction will go beyond the purely
professional. This phenomenon is a cause of concern to managers, because the
professional and personal spheres are beginning to blur. Employers are now
confronted with situations in which employees are not only preoccupied with
personal issues arising from outside of work, but with personal interactions
with other members of the organization during working hours. This situation
threatens traditional ideas of what should take place at work.
In an attempt to manage this problem, employers have instituted a variety
of rules and policies that regulate the extent to which employees are allowed to
personally interact with one another. In this paper, I discuss examples of two
types of regulations that employers have been implementing gradually,
antinepotism rules and nonfraternization policies. The proffered rationale for
these rules is based on interests other than the employer’s desire to keep
personal relationships out of the workplace. Supposedly, antinepotism rules are
6
about issues of favoritism and conflicts of interest, while nonfraternization
7
policies are a means to fight the “war on sexual harassment.” Both of these are
worthy causes, but the tools forged to pursue them are often unwieldy and
overly broad.
Antinepotism rules and nonfraternization policies are disquieting to
8
advocates of workers’ rights because they threaten employees’ right to privacy.
These regulations may have the effect of forcing employees to choose between
their job and their intimate relationship. This issue is particularly alarming since
it is usually the woman who eventually gives up her job when heterosexual
couples are forced to make a choice, for example, when no-spouse rules are
9
applied to couples who work together and want to get married. Therefore,
these facially neutral policies disparately impact the employment opportunities
of women and are arguably discriminatory under Title VII of the Civil Rights
10
Act.
The main argument in this paper is that we must abandon traditional
ideologies about work, such as the dichotomy between the professional and the
personal, and the unsubstantiated belief that mixing the two is inevitably bad
for business. The proliferation of broad policies banning joint employment of
spouses or fraternization among co-employees should be replaced with more
reasonable rules or standards that better balance employers’ business interests
and individual autonomy.

segregated jobs). Important to my argument is the fact that women and men are performing their
jobs in the same physical space where they can interact socially, even if they are performing different
tasks or jobs.
6. See infra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of these issues, see Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You Are
Not at Work?: Limiting the Use of Off-Duty Conduct As the Basis for Adverse Employment Decisions, 6 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 625, 657 (2004); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE 78-127 (2000).
9. Timothy D. Chandler et al., Spouses Need Not Apply: The Legality of Antinepotism and NoSpouse Rules, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 31, 45 (2002). I discuss this survey of federal and state case law
pertaining to no-spouse rules infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
10. Id.
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II. THE TWO-BODY PROBLEM AND ANTINEPOTISM RULES
Antinepotism rules are self-imposed restrictions on the joint employment
of members of the same family. There are more general policies, which limit the
ability of family members to work for one employer, and specific no-spouse
rules, which are concerned only with co-employment of married couples. The
broadness of no-spouse restrictions also vary: some forbid the hiring of already
married couples, but allow co-workers who marry during their employment to
continue in their jobs, while others rule out any co-employment within the
organization and require that one partner be discharged when two employees
11
get married.
Since the 1980s, more employers are adopting policies that prohibit family
members from holding closely-related jobs, a trend especially noticeable in the
12
public sector in which sensitivities to nepotism charges are high. One study
from 1986 reported that over forty percent of business organizations had
13
adopted an antinepotism policy. Antinepotism rules often address legitimate
issues, such as assuring fairness in hiring and promotional decisions, avoiding
potential conflicts of interest, especially when one family member is supervising
14
15
another, and preventing charges of favoritism. However, while antinepotism
rules were originally adopted to thwart the hiring of incompetent male relatives
16
of supervisors and managers, and thus had little impact on heterosexual
couples, today, with the growth of female labor market participation, these rules
17
particularly impinge on the career development of women.
Antinepotism rules are applied to couples because employers are afraid
that when a couple works together, they will bring their quarrels and tensions
18
with them to work. Managers are apprehensive about the possibility that the
11. Saily M. Avelenda, Comment: Love and Marriage in the American Workplace: Why No-Spouse
Policies Don’t Work, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 691, 693 (1998).
12. James Podgers, Marriage Traps in the Workplace: Nepotism Rules make it Harder for Spouses to be
Colleagues in Public Sector, 82 A.B.A. J. 46 (1996).
13. R. Ford & F. McLaughlin, Nepotism: Boon or Bane, 31 (11) PERSONNEL ADMIN. 78, 79-89 (1986)
(reporting that more than forty percent of all firms have some type of formal antinepotism policy
and that an additional seventeen percent reported having informal policies prohibiting couples from
working together). But see Kenneth E. Newgren, Calvin E. Kellogg & William Gardner, Corporate
Responses to Dual-Career Couples: A Decade of Transformation, 19 AKRON BUS. & ECON. REV. 85-96
(1988). Only ten percent of all firms preclude husbands and wives working in the same
organization. Id. However, most companies reported some restrictions, such as prohibiting couples
from working in the same department or from working in the same chain of command. Id.
14. James Werbel & David Hames, Are Two Birds in Hand Worth More Than One in the Bush: The
Case of Paired Employees, 2 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. REV. 317, 318-19 (1992) (delineating the different
objective of antinepotism rules when couples are concerned).
15. Christine M. Reed, Anti-Nepotism Rules and Dual Career Couples: Policy Questions for Public
Personnel Administrators, 17 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. J. 223, 224 (1988). Employees may feel that one
person has obtained employment or special favors as a result of his/her spouse’s influence. Id.
16. Joan G. Wexler, Husbands and Wives: The Uneasy Case for Antinepotism Rules, 62 B.U. L. REV.
75, 77 (1982).
17. Id. at 92. See also Leonard Bierman & Cynthia D. Fisher, Antinepotism Rules Applied to
Spouses: Business and Legal Viewpoints, 35 LAB. L.J. 634, 637 (1984); Timothy D. Chandler et al., Spouses
Need Not Apply: The Legality of Antinepotism and No-Spouse Rules, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 31, 64 (2002).
18. Saroj Parasuraman, Jeffrey Greenhaus & Cherlyn Granrose, Role Stressors, Social Support, and
Well Being Among Two Career Couples, 13 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 339 (1992) (discussing the
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distinction between home and work life will be erased by such workplace
interactions. The fragile distinction between the two is at the foundation of most
19
modern organizations, and no-spouse rules are viewed as a reliable safeguard
20
for maintaining it.
Why should people feel awkward working with couples, when in other
social contexts interacting with married couples is natural? Perhaps it is because
we were brought up to believe that the skill set we employ while working is not
only distinct, but also in direct tension with the skill set we need in order to
establish and preserve intimate relationships. To perform well at work, we are
presumed to act rationally, to focus on our professional duties, and to control
any psychological or emotional intrusions. The ideal worker, as he enters his
office or the shop floor, disassociates himself from his personal life and is not
21
occupied with thoughts about his spouse or children. It is no wonder that the
literature about women’s difficulties assimilating in the paid labor market is
22
23
framed as a “time-bind problem,” or the “work/family dilemma.”
Unfortunately even today, most people, including many feminists, have come to
24
view work and home as competing forces. A couple that works together is a
constant reminder to everyone around them that this division is artificial, a
reminder management apparently wishes to avoid.
Antinepotism rules that target spouses are vulnerable to criticism on many
25
grounds, including that they infringe upon the constitutional right to marry
26
and have a discriminatory impact on women.
Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford
27
Cocases was one of the first cases to challenge a no-spouse rule. In Yuhas, the
employer instituted a rule against the hiring of spouses of incumbent

concern that family strife will spill over to the workplace but concludes that the spillover from
family to work is actually minimal).
19. Reed, supra note 15, at 224 (explaining that according to traditional organization theory,
managers should attempt to “exclude or neutralize particularistic family ties that might compete for
primary loyalty to the organization”).
20. James Werbel & David Hames, Anti Nepotism Reconsidered: The Case Of Husband and Wife
Employment, 21 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. J. 365, 368 (1996) (noting that supervisory employees are more
likely to have negative attitudes toward joint employment of spouses).
21. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO
DO ABOUT IT (2000) (arguing that men unrestrained by care work are able to measure up to this
standard, while women burdened by other care responsibilities are unable to measure up to an
employer’s standard).
22. See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND HOME
BECOMES WORK (1997).
23. See Catherine Albiston, Reflections on our Twentieth Anniversary: Anti Essentialism and the
Work/Family Dilemma, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 30 (2005).
24. See Symposium, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to Do About It, 49
AM. U. L. REV. 823 (2000); Symposium, Still Hostile After All These Years? Gender, Work, and Family
Revisited, 44 VILL. L. R. 297 (1999).
25. Dennis Alerding, Note, The Family that Works Together. . . Can’t: No Spouse Rules as Marital
Status Discrimination Under State and Federal Law, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 867 (1994); Melanie L.
Jump, Note, Wright v. Metrohealth Medical Center: Anti-Nepotism Policies Carve a Slice in the
Fundamental Right To Marry—Is This the Wright or Wrong Decision?, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 841, 847 (1997);
Avelenda, supra note 11, at 691.
26. See Wexler, supra note 16, at 92.
27. 562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977).
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28

employees. The plaintiff, Dorothy Yuhas, contended that she was a victim of
sexual discrimination, because the no-spouse rule had a disparate impact on the
hiring of women. Since its introduction at the company, seventy-one women
and only three men were denied employment because the plant already
29
employed their spouses.
The employer offered various job related
explanations for adopting the policy, but was unable to show any statistical
evidence that employees who worked with their spouses were more prone to
absenteeism, tardiness, or scheduling difficulties, and that a no-spouse rule was
30
necessary to prevent these predicaments.
Despite the employer’s lack of evidence, the Seventh Circuit accepted the
employer’s general defense, holding that the no-spouse rule had substantial
discriminatory impact, but that the rule plausibly improved the work
environment and did not penalize women on the basis of their environmental or
31
genetic background. The court reasoned that:
the no-spouse rule is predicated on the assumption that it is generally a bad idea
to have both partners in a marriage working together. There are a number of
reasons why this assumption is plausible. First, the marital relationship often
generates intense emotions, which would interfere with a worker’s job
performance. The typical employee is often able to temporarily put aside these
emotional feelings when he or she goes to work because the work environment
is sharply differentiated from the home environment. This distinction becomes
32
impossible if the employee’s spouse is also his or her coworker.

The court agreed that:
[i]t would be hard to prove that any of these reasons for maintaining a nospouse rule are valid in the sense that, without the rule, production would fall.
Our devices for measuring industrial efficiency and morale are not so finely
tuned that they can easily make such a determination. On the other hand, these
reasons are far from frivolous. They correspond to the reasons that have led a
number of institutions to conclude that family members should not work in the
same environment. The movement to a sharp dichotomy between the
workplace and the home may not in the long run prove to be a fruitful one, but
33
it has become widely prevalent in our society.

In Yuhas, the no-spouse rule indisputably had a disparate impact on the
employment opportunities of women. Despite this disparate impact, the court
did not require any empirical showing that the application of the rule had
positive effects on productivity, morale or other business interests. In
authorizing the use of the rule, the court was satisfied merely by the fact that
many organizations implement antinepotism rules. Disparate impact theory is
precisely about examining whether unnecessary headwind is disrupting the
28. Id. at 497.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 499.
31. Id. at 500.
32. Id. at 499.
33. The Yuhas court found itself “left in a difficult situation. Defendant cannot statistically
prove that its rule increases production, but its arguments that the rule ‘improves’ the workplace are
convincing.” Id.
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decision-making process, without being subject to any critical evaluation. The
disparate impact model requires the decision-maker (and the trier of fact) to
examine closely whether the practice, in this case the no-spouse rule, is a valid
“business necessity,” or perhaps just an institutional norm the decision-maker
34
can do without. The fact that many organizations enforce no-spouse rules is
not a conclusive indication that they are a necessary or effective measure. It
only indicates that they are very common. The Yuhas court, in particular, after
rejecting the absenteeism justification, should have required the employer to
offer concrete evidence, such as empirical data, on the benefits of applying a nospouse rule.
No-spouse rules not only implicate the welfare and constitutional rights of
individuals affected by these rules, but also strengthen the documented
35
demographic shift of professional couples to large metropolitan areas. As more
women participate in the labor market, it is increasingly difficult for couples
with both partners working to find satisfactory employment in the same
vicinity. In small towns and more remote areas, labor market opportunities are
limited, especially if one is seeking employment in a specific field of expertise. It
is not uncommon to find only one hospital, one university or one police squad
in many smaller employment markets. A restriction requiring spouses to find
employment with different employers might prove to be an insurmountable
barrier, because no two employers exist within a reasonable commute. The
problem becomes more obvious when both spouses are in the same field.
Organizations enforcing these restrictions might encounter difficulty in
retaining their employees, as they seek alternative employment in large
metropolitan areas, where dual careers in the same field are feasible.
College-educated couples have been moving to big cities in large numbers.
In 1970, thirty-nine percent of college-educated couples lived in metropolitan
36
areas of at least two million people. By 1990 this figure had jumped to fifty
37
percent. As described above, dual-career couples face the difficulty of finding
two jobs commensurate with the skills of each spouse within a reasonable
commute from home. The resulting co-location problem leads to a greater
concentration of college-educated couples in larger cities, which offer many
38
more potential job matches. As a result, “low amenity areas may experience
39
reduced flows of human capital . . . and therefore become poorer.”
34. See Robert Belton, A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and Resurrection of the Disparate Impact
Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431 (2005).
35. See Dora Costa & Mathew Kahn, Power Couples: Changes in the Locational Choice of the College
Educated, 1940-1990, 115 Q. J. ECON. 1287 (2000).
36. Id. at 1287.
37. Id. The urbanization trend of college-educated couples stands in contrast to the pattern of
non-college-educated couples: In 1970 only thirty percent of the latter category lived in large
metropolitan areas, and that figure only grew to thirty-four percent by 1990. Id.
38. Id. at 1288, 1310-1311. But see Janice Compton & Robert Pollack, Why Are Power Couples
Increasingly Concentrated in Large Metropolitan Areas? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. W10918, 2004) (arguing the location trends are better explained by the higher rate of power
couple formation in large metropolitan areas, and that it is only the education of the husband and
not the joint education profile of the couple that affects the propensity to migrate to large
metropolitan areas).
39. Id. at 1289.
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Parks v. Warner Robbins exemplifies the dilemma faced by many working
40
couples in small communities. In 1984, Brenda Parks and A.J. Mathern joined
41
the police department in Warner Robins, a fairly small town in central
42
43
Georgia. In 1989, the two became engaged. Mathern discussed his plans with
the Chief of Police of Warner-Robins, who informed him that his marriage
would violate the city’s antinepotism policy which prohibited relatives of city
44
employees in supervisory positions from working in the same department.
The Chief of Police told Mathern that “if the two married, the less-senior Parks
45
would have to leave the police department.” Rather than lose her job, Parks
postponed the wedding and sued the city.
Parks argued that the antinepotism policy violated her substantive due
46
process rights by denying her the fundamental right to marry.
While the
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that, “the policy may place increased economic
burdens on certain city employees who wish to marry one another, the policy
47
does not forbid them from marrying.” Because, as the court argues:
the true intent and direct effect of the policy is to ensure that no city employee
will occupy a supervisory position vis-à-vis one of his or her relatives[,] . . . [a]ny
increased economic burden created by the antinepotism policy is no more than
an incidental effect of a policy aimed at maintaining the operational efficiency of
Warner Robins’ governmental departments, not a direct attempt to control the
48
marital decisions of city employees.

The court concluded, “because the antinepotism policy does not prevent the
less-senior spouse from working in another department or outside the Warner
Robins municipal government it is unlikely that the policy will actually prevent
49
affected couples from marrying.”
While the court’s reasoning that antinepotism will not thaw individual
50
plans to get married may be accurate, it may well lead to both employees
quitting their jobs to seek employment elsewhere. Warner Robins is a relatively
51
small municipality in a small county.
Parks and Mathern were two

40. 43 F.3d 609 (11th Cir. 1995).
41. Brenda Parks was a Sergeant in the Special Investigative Unit of the Warner Robins Police
Department, and A.J. Mathern was a Captain in the Criminal Investigative Unit of the Warner
Robins Police Department. Id. at 611.
42. According to the 2000 Census, the population of the City of Warner Robins was 48,804
persons. In 2002, the population of Houston County, where Warner Robins is located, was
estimated at 116,768. See Welcome to the City of Warner Robbins, http://www.warnerrobins.org/about.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
43. Parks, 43 F.3d at 611.
44. Id. at 611-12. The antinepotism policy is cited in footnote 1 of the Court’s decision. Id. at
611-12 n.1.
45. Id. at 612.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 614.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 616.
50. Though in the Parks case, the couple did postpone their plans to marry by four years. Id. at
612.
51. See figures, supra note 42.
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professionals: she, a Sergeant in the special investigative unit, he, a Captain in
52
the criminal investigative unit. Both were already invested in their chosen
career. Parks might have found it difficult to find comparable employment
within a reasonable commute, and therefore one of the couple’s viable options
was to relocate to a larger city where both could find employment. Thus, while
it is true that no-spouse rules do not formally prevent marriage, they can
influence the decision if and when to get married.
53
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Rath Packing Company,
another no-spouse rule was attacked in a small community with limited job
opportunities. Rath’s Columbus Junction facility employed approximately 250
persons, of which, ninety-five percent were male. The population of Columbus
54
Junction was approximately 1500 persons; thus the company employed a sixth
of the town’s population. In August 1973, Rath prospectively implemented a
55
no-spouse rule prohibiting the employment of spouses of Rath employees.
From approximately 1966 to the time of trial, Rath employed seven married
56
couples at the Columbus Junction plant. From January 1, 1973, to February 15,
1978, twenty-six female applicants were denied employment because they were
57
spouses of current employees.
The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) filed a lawsuit alleging in its complaint that Rath refused to
hire women at its Columbus Junction plant and that Rath’s policy of not hiring
spouses of employees excluded a disproportionate number of women from
58
employment. The Eighth Circuit did not give any special consideration to the
fact that the antinepotism rule was applied in a very small community, thus
substantially limiting the ability of married couples to both find employment.
However, the court did strike down the antinepotism rule, basing its decision on
59
a Title VII disparate impact theory.
Despite that victory, most legal challenges of antinepotism rules have been
fairly unsuccessful. A recent, extensive survey of the case law involving claims
60
challenging no-spouse rules revealed that out of the thirty-four federal cases
and thirty-five state cases, the plaintiff prevailed in only nine percent of the
61
federal lawsuits and in less than half of the cases presented in state courts.
Moreover, the vast majority of the seventy-nine alleged victims were married
62
employees (84%) and most often, they were women (71%). These findings are
consistent with the claim that antinepotism rules disparately impact women.

52. Parks, 43 F.3d at 611.
53. 787 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1986).
54. Id. at 322.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. For the court’s reasoning why Rath lacked a “business necessity” justification for the nospouse rule, see id. at 328.
60. See Chandler, supra note 9.
61. Id. at 43-44. Lawsuits are more likely to prevail in state courts, because while federal law
(Title VII of the Civil Rights Act) does not prohibit discrimination based on marital status, some
states have legislated particular prohibitions on marital status employment discrimination. Id.
62. Id.
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Although neutral on their face, these rules disproportionately affect the female
partner in the relationship, whether upon the mutual decision of the couple
concerned or the unilateral decision of the employer. It is thus surprising that
only one Title VII disparate impact lawsuit pertaining to antinepotism rules has
63
succeeded in federal court.
Formal rules against spousal co-employment should be replaced with
flexible standards which take into account specific circumstances. We should
reject the Yuhas standard of legitimizing no-spouse rules by referring to popular
64
beliefs about the harms of joint employment. The only point on which the
managerial literature agrees is that co-employment of spouses in a direct
65
supervisory relationship may create problems. There appears to be no other
consensus on the harms of joint employment, and most research actually points
66
out advantages to allowing spouses to work for the same employer. Most
obviously, employers experience less turnover because couples are less likely to
look for new jobs. Offering co-employment to couples can also lure talent,
particularly to geographical areas in which employment opportunities are
limited. Some spouses of incumbent employees are good candidates for
employment (or good employees, in the case they met during their joint
employment), and a restriction on hiring them, or an obligation to fire one of
them, simply does not benefit the organization. In addition, workers also often
find it satisfying to work with their spouse, thus motivating them to work
67
harder and to feel connected with the workplace.
Not all cases of joint employment of spouses lead to organizational strife,
favoritism, jealousy, and tension among other co-workers. It depends on the
personalities of the people concerned, the setting of the organization, and the
68
specific positions and jobs of the couple. Therefore, the legality of no-spouse
rules should usually be restricted to circumstances in which one spouse is in a
direct supervisory relationship with another spouse. Such restrictions would
diminish the impact of the prohibition substantially, enabling more couples to
obtain and retain employment. The antinepotism case law survey revealed that
only nineteen percent of the cases actually involved a supervisor-subordinate
69
relationship, meaning that eighty percent of the cases would be resolved if
these rules were narrowed to supervisory situations.
63. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d at 318.
64. The Yuhas court explanation of why it authorized the no-spouse rule is discussed supra
notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
65. Reed, supra note 15, at 223, 224, 227; Werbel & Hames, Are Two Birds in Hand Worth More
Than One in the Bush: The Case of Paired Employees, supra note 14, at 317, 320; Werbel & Hames, Anti
Nepotism Reconsidered: The Case of Husband and Wife Employment, supra note 20, at 365.
66. Reed, supra note 15, at 223 (the ability to retain and recruit good workers eases the familywork tension); Werbel & Hames, Are Two Birds in Hand Worth More Than One in the Bush: The Case of
Paired Employees, supra note 14, at 317 (paired employees facilitate group performances, reduce
stress, and reduce staffing problems); Werbel & Hames, Anti Nepotism Reconsidered: The Case of
Husband and Wife Employment, supra note 20, at 365, 367 (more unity between professional and
personal lives encourages better coordination and employment stability).
67. For discussion of these advantages, see Avelenda, supra note 11, at 704.
68. Werbel & Hames, Are Two Birds in Hand Worth More Than One in the Bush: The Case of Paired
Employees, supra note 14, at 317.
69. Chandler, supra note 9, at 44.
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By scrutinizing more closely the business justification for antinepotism
rules, the courts can play a significant role in breaking down the unfounded
work-family dichotomy. Allowing spouses to work together reduces the tension
70
between the personal and professional sphere. Given the rise in the number of
dual career couples, such a policy change is warranted to ensure equal
employment opportunities for women, to guarantee the right to privacy, and to
give couples greater geographic flexibility.
III. ROMANCE IN THE WORKPLACE
Romantic relationships at work are everywhere. Everyone working is
aware of them, and many have been involved in a workplace romance.
According to Vault’s 2005 Office Romance Survey, fifty-eight percent of
employees say they have been involved in an office romance, which is up from
71
forty-six percent two years ago. In addition, surveys consistently document
that eighty percent of American employees are aware of some type of romantic
72
relationship between two employees at their workplace.
Romantic
relationships are legally distinguishable from sexually harassing behavior, since
73
they are consensual and welcomed by both parties involved. However, they
differ from other personal intimate relationships, because they include a sexual
74
component.

70. See UMA SEKARAN, DUAL-CAREER FAMILIES 43-70 (1986) (arguing that co-employment of
couples may enable them to manage work-family conflicts more effectively).
71. See Cupid in the Cubicle, Says New Vault Survey, VAULT, Feb. 1, 2005,
http://www.vault.com/nr/newsmain.jsp?nr_page=3&ch_id=420&article_id=23513899 (surveying
610 employees representing a variety of industries across the US). Other sources support this point.
See e.g., Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L. J. 2061, 2124 n.254 (2003) ( “Most studies
suggest that between twenty-four percent and thirty-seven percent of all employees have
participated in an office romance at some time.”); Claire J. Anderson & Caroline Fisher, Male-Female
Relationships in the Workplace: Perceived Motivations in Office Romance, 25 SEX ROLES 163, 171 (1991)
(indicating that thirty percent of 168 employees admitted to involvement in an “intimate affair” at
some time with someone at the same firm).
72. See Yiannis Gabriel & Rita Mano-Nergin, Workplace Romance in Cold and Hot Organizational
Climates: The Experience of Israel and Taiwan (Tanaka Business School Discussion Paper:
TBS/DP04/30, 2004), available at http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/pls/portallive/docs/1/40409.PDF.
These estimates align with Schultz’s research. See Schultz, supra note 71, at 2124 n.254 (citing a
handful of surveys conducted since the mid-1980s on this issue, which confirm that about eighty
percent of employees have observed romantic interaction in their workplaces).
73. The distinction between voluntary participation and welcomed involvement was set forth in
the seminal case Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (“The fact that sex-related
conduct was ‘voluntary,’ in the sense that the complainant was not forced to participate against her
will, is not a defense to a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII. The gravamen of any
sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were ‘unwelcome.’ . . . The correct
inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were
unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.”).
74. The workplace is a stage to form other types of personal relationships such as strong
friendships or mentorships. These relationships may become psychologically intimate but are not
characterized by physical intimacy. I restrict my discussion to those relationships that are sexual in
nature. For a study of other intimate relationships formed at the workplace, see Sharon Lobel et al.,
Love Without Sex: The Impact of Psychological Intimacy Between Men and Women, 23 ORGANIZATIONAL
DYNAMICS 1 (1994) (finding that psychologically intimate work relationships are characterized by
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Research demonstrates that workers with higher physical and/or
75
functional proximity are more likely to be sexually attracted to each other.
Physical proximity arises when two workers are physically occupying the same
76
space, such as sharing an office or working side by side on the shop floor.
Functional proximity refers to closeness which results from the actual conduct of
work, such as when employees interact with each other while working together
77
on a project or deal. It should come as no surprise that in organizations in
which men and women work long hours together and share professional goals,
78
they find one another sexually attractive and often act upon their attraction.
When defending its decision to regulate its employees’ sexual relationships,
management often points to its perception that such relationships will lead to
conflicts of interest, favoritism, inefficiency resulting from spending time and
energy on non-work social activities, and reduced morale or jealousy of co79
workers. However, by far, the greatest concern employers voice is that one of
the parties, or another employee, will charge the company or one of its
80
employees with sexual harassment. In a 2001 Society for Human Resources
Management (SHRM) survey, ninety-five percent of human resource
professionals cited a “potential for claims of sexual harassment” as a reason to
81
ban or discourage workplace romances. Under the guise of protecting their
employees from sexual harassment, employers are continuously expanding their
sexual harassment policies to incorporate non-fraternization clauses or other
informal means of restricting and regulating intra-organizational intimate
82
interaction.

affection and concern for one another, shared attitudes and affirmations of one another’s worth and
accomplishments).
75. Id.
76. Charles A. Pierce, Donn Byrne & Herman Aguinis, Attraction in Organizations: A Model of
Workplace Romance, 17 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 5, 10-11 (1996).
77. Gary N. Powell & Sharon Foley, Something to Talk About: Romantic Relationships in
Organizational Settings, 24 J. MGMT. 421, 428-31 (1998).
78. See LISA MAINIERO, OFFICE ROMANCE: LOVE, POWER, AND SEX IN THE WORKPLACE (1989).
79. These issues are present in the literature dealing with romantic relationships at work. See
Gary M. Kramer, Limited License to Fish off the Company Pier: Toward Express Employer Policies, 22 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 77, 83 (2000). That these types of concerns are prevalent is evident from SOC’Y FOR
HUMAN RES. MGMT., 1998 WORKPLACE ROMANCE (1998) [hereinafter 1998 SHRM SURVEY]. Of the 617
human resource professionals polled about the outcome of romantic relationships at work, twentyeight percent reported complaints of favoritism from co-workers, twenty-four percent reported
decreased productivity by those involved in the romance, eleven percent reported decreased
productivity by co-workers, eight percent reported decreased morale of those involved in the
romance, and sixteen percent reported decreased morale of co-workers. Id.
80. Charles Pierce et al., Responding to Sexual Harassment Complaints: Effects of a Dissolved
Workplace Romance on Decision Making Standards, 95 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 66 (2004); Kramer, supra note 79, at 86-87. Citing several human resources experts,
Kramer concludes that it is unclear just how often sexual harassment claims grow out of a failed
office romance, but abundant anecdotal evidence suggests that it is a common occurrence. Id.
81. SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., 2001 WORKPLACE ROMANCE (2001) [hereinafter 2001 SHRM
SURVEY]. In comparison, the second most widely cited rationale, “concerns about lowered
productivity by those involved in the romance,” was cited by only forty-six percent of respondents.
Id.
82. See discussion infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
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A 1999 survey reported that ninety-seven percent of the 496 companies that
responded to a faxed survey indicated that they had written sexual harassment
83
policies, and sixty-two percent indicated that they had training programs.
Another survey conducted in 1997 reported that ninety-five percent of
employers contacted adopted sexual harassment grievance procedures and
84
more than seventy percent had training programs.
In addition, many companies adopt policies that reach beyond the legal
85
requirements of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Some regulate consensual
workplace relationships, which are by no means prohibited by the Supreme
Court’s sexual harassment decisions. The 1998 SHRM Workplace Romance Survey
revealed that twenty-eight percent of human resource respondents work at
86
companies that have written non-fraternization policies.
Another fourteen
percent of respondents reported that although their employers lacked a written
policy, there is an unwritten understanding that office romance is frowned upon
87
and discouraged.
In general, policies prohibiting consensual relationships between
employees take three forms. The first is an outright, formal prohibition of
coworker fraternization, although in many companies, this prohibition is limited
88
to supervisor-subordinate relationships. Legal challenges to non-fraternization
policies have been unsuccessful where employers forewarned their employees
89
about them and then applied them consistently.
Human Resource experts
continue to encourage companies to adopt express written policies, which
prohibit, in specific circumstances, intimate relationships between coworkers,
90
especially those between supervisors and the employees whom they supervise.
A less authoritative monitoring device is to informally disapprove of and to
91
The 2001 SHRM Workplace
discourage intra-organization fraternization.

83. Schultz, supra note 71, at 2094 n.96 (citing SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., SEXUAL
HARASSMENT SURVEY 6, 8 (1999)).
84. Id.
85. Schultz, supra note 71, at 2094-95 (“These policies tend to reach broadly to forbid many
forms of potentially harmless sexual conduct without demanding inquiry into the surrounding
factors that would determine legal liability.”).
86. 1998 SHRM SURVEY, supra note 79 (providing that seventy percent of the respondent
companies prohibit romance between a supervisor and subordinate, nineteen percent prohibit
romances between department members, and fifteen percent require that those involved in the
romance inform their supervisors of the relationship). Vicki Schultz reports similar numbers: “The
available research suggests that between twenty-two percent and thirty-nine percent of companies
have written or verbal policies or clear organizational norms on workplace romance, and that the
overwhelming majority of these companies prohibit or discourage such romance.” Schultz, supra
note 71, at 2129.
87. 1998 SHRM SURVEY, supra note 79.
88. See Schultz supra note 71, at 2129, for estimates of the prevalence of formal prohibitions in
organizations.
89. Cindy Schaefer, Managing Workplace Romances, 66 SAM ADVANCED MGMT. J. 3, 5 (2001).
90. Kramer, supra note 79, at 77-78 (“An emerging consensus among business academics, labor
and employment law attorneys, human resource management specialists, training consultants, and
other personnel professionals encourages and recommends these policies.”).
91. Fourteen percent of respondents of the 1998 SHRM SURVEY reported that although their
employers lacked a written policy, there is an unwritten understanding that office romance is
frowned upon and discouraged. 1998 SHRM SURVEY, supra note 79.
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Romance Survey reported that half of all employees surveyed believed that
92
workplace romance “should be hidden by the parties involved.”
One
shortcoming of an informal approach is the uncertainty of communication. If
the policy is unwritten, employees do not know what steps the employer will
93
take once the relationship is revealed. This creates an ambiguous working
environment for employees who cannot be expected to adhere to policies that
94
are not clearly defined or communicated.
The third alternative is to formally require employees to report the
initiation and the aftermath of consensual relationships. The 1998 SHRM
Workplace Romance Survey revealed that fifteen percent of respondents require
95
that those involved in the romance inform their supervisors of the relationship.
Another popular solution is to request the parties involved to sign a “love
96
contract.” This contract essentially allows the couple to continue their business
and personal relationship, but presumably eliminates the employer’s liability in
97
a future sexual harassment claim. In the contract, both parties agree that the
relationship is consensual and does not violate the company’s sexual
98
harassment policy.
Given management’s concern that any kind of external sexual
99
manifestation at work is counterproductive, human resource managers are
using the public’s growing interest in sexual harassment to prevent consensual,
welcomed sexual relationships as well. The current judicially-created definition
of sexual harassment sometimes covers instances in which the plaintiff
100
consented to the relationship, but felt coerced or did not welcome it.
92. 2001 SHRM SURVEY, supra note 81.
93. Schaefer, supra note 89, at 5.
94. Id.
95. 1998 SHRM SURVEY, supra note 79.
96. Schaefer, supra note 89, at 7; Kramer, supra note 79, at 138-43.
97. Id.
98. A typical love contract will contain the following provisions: “We hereby notify the
Company that we wish to enter into a voluntary and mutual consensual social relationship. In
entering into this relationship, we both understand and agree that we are both free to end the social
relationship at any time. Should the social relationship end, we both agree that we shall not allow
the breakup to negatively impact the performance of our duties. Prior to signing this Consensual
Relationship Contract, we received and reviewed the Company Sexual Harassment Policy, a copy of
which is attached hereto. By signing below, we acknowledge that the social relationship between us
does not violate the Company’s Sexual Harassment Policy, and that entering into the social
relationship has not been made a condition or term of employment.” Schaefer, supra note 89, at 7.
For another version of a love contract with very similar content, see Kramer, supra note 79, at 140.
99. GARY POWELL, WOMEN AND MEN IN MANAGEMENT 122-43 (2d ed. 1993). Involvement in a
romantic relationship may affect how the partners conduct themselves in their formal work roles. Id.
Romantic relationships in organizational settings may result in conflicts of interest, flawed or biased
decision making, and other workplace inequities that have a negative impact on individual and
organizational performance. Id. See also ANDREA BARIDON & DAVID EYLER, WORKING TOGETHER:
THE NEW RULES AND REALITIES FOR MANAGING MEN AND WOMEN AT WORK 149 (1994) (arguing that
the introduction of gender into workplace groupings opens up issues such as jealousy, triangles,
favoritism, territoriality, mismatched attraction and awkward breakups).
100. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 68-9 (“The District Court in this case erroneously focused
on the “voluntariness” of respondent’s participation in the claimed sexual episodes. The correct
inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were
unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.”).
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Employers become anxious because they view this broad definition of sexual
harassment in conjunction with the possibility of being held vicariously liable
for sexually harassing behavior committed by supervisors against employees.
The standards of sexual harassment law are articulated in Faragher v. City of Boca
101
102
Raton, Burlington Ind., Inc. v. Ellerth, and most recently in Pennsylvania State
103
Police v. Suders.
The rationale that employers thus offer when they regulate
their employees’ sexual behavior is that they cannot distinguish between
104
welcomed relationships from sexually harassing ones,
that consensual
105
relationships may culminate in sexual harassment claims, and that the
Supreme Court encourages employers’ self-regulation and inquiry into the
sexual activity of their workers by recommending that employers institute an
106
anti-sexual harassment policy with grievance procedures.

101.
102.

524 U.S. 775 (1998).
524 U.S. 742 (1998). This case stands for the proposition that:

an employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable
hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher)
authority over the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending
employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. . . . The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a)
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise. . . . No affirmative defense is available, however, when the
supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge,
demotion, or undesirable reassignment.
Id. at 765. The exact affirmative defense is articulated in the twin decision Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
103. 542 U.S. 129 (2004). Suders, decided on June 14, 2004, is a clarification of the Ellerth/Faragher
standard of vicarious liability. See id. In Suders, the Supreme Court refused to recognize
constructive discharge as a “tangible employment action,” a recognition that would trigger
Ellerth/Faragher strict liability in the case that the harasser was a supervisor. Id.
104. See Kramer, supra note 79, at 82 n.20 (citing business sources warning about the
impossibility of the distinction: “[C]onfusion arises when office romance shifts the balance of power,
it may look like sexual harassment. That’s why dating between supervisors and subordinates is
supervisory suicide.”).
105. See Pierce, supra note 80, at 67.
106. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (“While proof that an employer had promulgated an anti-harassment
policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a
stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case
when litigating the first element of the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill
the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing any
unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of
such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the second element of the
defense.”); see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The encouragement to adopt a sexual harassment policy
was further explained in Suders, 542 U.S at 219 (“[T]ying the liability standard to an employer’s effort
to install effective grievance procedures would advance Congress’ purpose ‘to promote conciliation
rather than litigation’ of Title VII controversies. At the same time, such linkage of liability limitation
to effective preventive and corrective measures could serve Title VII’s deterrent purpose by
encouraging employees to report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive.”)
(citation omitted). It is argued that an employer that specifically discusses and discourages
consensual sexual relationships in its sexual harassment policy will be more successful in its
argument that it adequately discharged its duty to prevent such behavior, if a sexual harassment
claim arises later. See Kramer, supra note 79, at 121-22.
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In addition, feminists like Catherine MacKinnon provide theoretical and
moral support for expanding employer self-regulation to cover consensual
romantic relationships.
MacKinnon argues that virtually all romantic
relationships in a workplace setting constitute sexual harassment because they
are a product of men’s domination and control over women, and not of mutual
107
sexual interest.
Anthropologist Margaret Mead argues that society should
make intimate sexual interaction between people who work in the same
108
organization a social taboo—just like the taboo against incest.
From her
standpoint, social networks at work have developed to compensate for the
breakdown in the extended family, and the taboo is warranted to restrict this
109
trend.
By contrast, I argue that many of the broad policies are unnecessary to fight
sexual harassment, since in most cases individuals can and do make distinctions
between sexual harassment and assault on the one hand, and pleasurable,
110
mutually desired sexual interaction and relationships on the other.
In
addition, legal liability is conferred upon the employer only in cases in which he
was negligent in instituting an anti-harassment policy and providing his
111
employees an avenue through which to complain.
The legal duty of the
employer is to take action in cases in which an alleged victim comes forward
and complains, rather than to police all intimate relationships going on within
the organization. In addition, when the harasser is a supervisor, the Supreme
Court decisions only confer vicarious liability onto the employer in cases where
the harassment culminates in tangible employment actions, such as discharge,
112
demotion, or undesirable reassignment.
When no adverse tangible
employment actions are present, or the harassment was conducted by a nonsupervisory employee, the liability standard is a simple negligence standard,
whereby courts will simply inquire into whether the employer “knew or should
113
have known” of the harassment.
It is clear from all of these rules that policies forbidding consensual
relationships between employees go beyond what is necessary to prevent sexual
harassment in the workplace. As some commentators have pointed out, the
fight against sexual harassment was possible not only because companies
wanted to avoid vicarious liability in sexual harassment claims, but because the
107. CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, 25-95 (1979). See also
LINDA LEMONCHECK, LOOSE WOMEN, LECHEROUS MEN: A FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY OF SEX (1997)
(arguing that heterosexuality is oppressive to women, particularly in workplaces that are dominated
and controlled by men, and that heterosexual relationships that take place at work are inherently
involuntary and unequal since men in general have more power, income, and status than women);
Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 859 n.73 (1991) (arguing that power imbalances
between men and women reflected in traditional sex roles are carried over into the employment
context and women do what those in power expect and demand, of them).
108. Margaret Mead, A Proposal: We need Taboos on Sex at Work, in SEXUALITY IN ORGANIZATIONS
53-56 (Neugraten & Shafritz ed., 1980).
109. Id.
110. Christine Williams, Patti Giuffre & Kirsten Dellinger, Sexuality in the Workplace:
Organizational Control, Sexual Harassment and the Pursuit of Pleasure, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 73, 75 (1999).
111. See supra notes 102, 106.
112. Id.
113. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799-800.
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fight was supportive of pre-existing managerial notions that sex is bad for
114
productivity.
The idea that sexual harassment is bad for business has been
applied by employers to consensual relationships at the workplace, even
between spouses, as discussed above, because “the eradication of sexuality from
the workplace is consistent with the bureaucratic ideals in which depersonalized
occupational roles serve as model for dedicated work.”115 Again, this
eradication reflects the scientific management theory that, while at work,
116
employees should not be preoccupied with their personal lives. “Attempts to
banish sexuality from the workplace are a part of the wider process that
differentiated the home, the location of legitimate sexual activity, from the place
of capitalist production. The concept of disembodied jobs symbolizes this
117
separation of work and sexuality.”
Thus, it is not surprising that many
employers have adopted overbroad policies that prohibit relationships between
consenting adults, as well as sexually harassing behavior.
IV. CONCLUSION
Society needs to scrutinize more closely the various policies that employers
are voluntarily adopting to regulate their employees’ intimate relationships.
Society must also ensure that employees are not placed, unnecessarily, in a
position in which they are required to choose between a significant intimate
relationship and their job. The rules promulgated by many employers are often
broader than what is needed to protect them from vicarious liability stemming
from sexual harassment claims or to enhance productivity.
These rules have been allowed to evolve, in part, because judicial scrutiny
of no-spouse rules and nonfraternization policies is not at all strict, permitting
employers to raise general and unsubstantiated claims about the business
necessity of the rules at question. It appears that the courts are also influenced
by popular beliefs about the harms entailed in the joint employment of spouses
or the existence of romantic interaction among co-workers. However, there is
no conclusive evidence that co-employment of spouses or of individuals that are
intimately involved are less productive than their counterparts, or hamper
general productivity.
Theories of how and to what extent intimate sexual relationships affect
productivity, organizational efficiency, morale of co-workers, and instances of
conflict of interest should receive better empirical validation. Existing research
relies heavily on surveys of human resource professionals polled on how office
118
romance impacts the organization.
Yet there is hardly any research actually
confronting these claims with quantitative measurements of productivity,

114. Schultz, supra note 71, at 2061.
115. Sharon Lobel, Sexuality at Work: Where Do We Go from Here?, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 136,
137 (1993).
116. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
117. JOAN ACKER, HIERARCHIES, JOBS, BODIES: A THEORY OF GENDERED ORGANIZATIONS 139
(1990), cited in Lobel, Sexuality at Work: Where Do We Go from Here?, supra note 115, at 138.
118. Pierce, supra note 76, is a comprehensive review of this literature. The review reports of
mixed results from surveys: Some find that office romances increase job productivity and worker
morale, and others find the opposite. See id.
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employee morale, or any other substantive measure. It is quite possible that
human resource professionals are themselves biased by a century of
indoctrination that sex at work is bad for business.
A good starting point for prospective reform is to make a clear distinction.
On the one hand, there are cases in which supervisory authority is present and
restrictions on relationships may be warranted. On the other hand, there are
cases in which no supervisory authority exists and the default rule should be
that broad restrictions are not permissible without specific justifications. Instead
of promulgating strict rules, employers should be encouraged to adopt
standards, or particular procedures, which will overcome some of the
difficulties associated with couples who work for the same company. For
example, if favoritism and conflicts of interest are a cause of concern in the
119
hiring of spouses, the hiring could be done through an open search process.
Another possibility would be to allow only one partner per department or per
chain of command, while endorsing an intra-organizational transfer program.
There is much talk about the pressing need to transform the workplace into
a more family-friendly environment. Currently the focus is on various
programs, such as flextime and other accommodation schemes that would
enable women (and men) to better balance their work responsibilities with their
childcare responsibilities. But family friendliness is not just about how society
factors in that employees have personal lives outside the workplace. It is also
about acknowledging that workers may, and often do, form personal
relationships on the job. The goal of accommodating the personal needs of
workers is partially frustrated when employers force their employees to leave
their emotions and personal relationships at the office door.

119. Werbel & Hames, Are Two Birds in Hand Worth More Than One in the Bush: The Case Of Paired
Employees, supra note 14, at 317, 320.

